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INTRODUCTION: FAULTS OF THE FAULT SYSTEM AND THE NEED FOR
FUNDAMENTAL REFORM

Suits to recover for personal injuries resulting from medical malpractice
can be among the most unpredictable and most complex to litigate. Because
provider fault is frequently difficult to measure-even (and sometimes
especially) with the assistance of the parties' alleged (and opposing) expertsa lay jury is apt to be influenced more by its subjective and emotional reaction
to the injured patient's plight than by the appropriateness of the defendant's
conduct. Thus, lengthy and costly litigation can yield unpredictable results,
and this unpredictability raises the costs of claims evaluation and often makes
settlements harder to reach. Perceptions of the system as a game of chance
rather than as a sound mechanism for catching negligent behavior may
undercut the system's value in raising professional standards and deterring
injuries.' If providers of health care believe that the legal system lacks the
capacity to be reasonable and may penalize even the appearance of
negligence, they may err in the direction of practicing inefficient "defensive
medicine" by spending large amounts to make it appear that nothing was

spared in the plaintiff's case.
The system's haphazardness also diminishes its value as a protection for
injured patients. One seriously injured party may recover nothing at all or far
less than fair compensation, while another receives an award far in excess of
his actual loss. Inconsistency is enhanced by allowing juries to award
damages for such noneconomic losses as pain and suffering and loss of
consortium. Because monetary valuation of such nonmonetary losses is
inherently irrational, plaintiffs are encouraged to play upon the jury's
sympathy, further distracting attention from the issue of provider fault. The
cost of the tort system is also increased, without increasing its value as a
Copyright © 1986 by Law and Contemporary Problems
* John Allan Love Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
The author warmly thanks George Constantinople, University of Virginia Law School, class of
1986, for his valuable help in the preparation of this article.
1. J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: No-FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
44 (1975).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 49: No. 2

compensation device, by allowing some victims to recover from a tortfeasor
amounts already reimbursed to the plaintiff by such collateral sources as
2
health insurance or an employer's sick leave program.
Litigation actually occurs with respect to only a small fraction of claims,
and it has been argued that the claims-insurance system works better as a
whole than it does in the more visible minority of cases that are contested in
court.3

Nevertheless,

litigation

prospects

determine

plaintiffs'

and

defendants' assessments of settlement possibilities, and substantial costs are
incurred in evaluating claims. An optimal system would be one that facilitates
settlement of most claims by prompt, periodic payment of the injured party's
net economic loss. Yet, the unpredictable and intensely adversary nature of
malpractice suits makes such settlements rare today. Defendants fear that a

prompt offer to cover a victim's net economic losses might be seen as a
confession of weakness and encourage the victim to pursue a larger recovery
through litigation. On the other side of the case, the plaintiff's attorney,
working for a contingent fee and hopeful of a "big hit," has an undue
incentive to discourage settlement and take a case to trial. Because the lawyer
can spread the risk of nonrecovery in a single case over an entire portfolio of
claims, his interest in achieving a reasonable settlement is less than that of his
client, who risks everything on a single claim.
Other factors also reduce the value of the medical malpractice system both
as a deterrent to bad practice and as a compensation mechanism. First, a
patient may have difficulty knowing whether a bad medical outcome resulted
from negligence or some other cause, with the result that a great deal of
provider negligence goes undetected and unpoliced. Second, some patients
may be inhibited in bringing claims against physicians and hospital personnel
whom they have depended upon and trusted. After all, a patient must, in
order to recover anything at all, assume a prolonged accusatory stance toward
the provider who has cared for him. Not only does this enforced
adversariness reduce the number of claims that will be brought, but it adds to
the difficulty of settling claims and to the psychic wear and tear of malpractice
suits. The effects of the system on provider/patient relationships are among
the uncalculated costs of the tort system as it has evolved in the medical care
4
field.
For the foregoing reasons, the tort system, especially in the area of
medical malpractice-although products liability presents problems of similar
2. O'Connell, A "Neo-No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident Guarantees of Postaccident
Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 898, 900-01 (1985).
3. P. DANZON & L. LILLARD, THE RESOLUTION OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: RESEARCH
RESULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS vi-vii (The Rand Corp., Report No. R-2793-ICJ 1982).
4. A report by the Board of Trustees of the American Medical Association finds that "the
biggest cost" of suits brought under the malpractice system is "the emotional injury that a physician
experiences when he or she believes that he or she has done the best possible under difficult
circumstances. Decreases in physician productivity as a result of such dysfunction cannot be

estimated."

BOARD OF TRUSTEES [AM. MEDICAL ASS'N], STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY COSTS

(1983) (Substitute Resolution 8, A82 Report: N(I-83)).
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magnitude 5-is no longer fulfilling the purposes for which it was intended. 6
The legal system's effort to devise a fair and rational method for
compensating injured persons and disciplining poor professional practice has
produced only a litigation lottery. Everyone paying for health care is forced
to buy tickets in this lottery despite the poor chances of winning. Moreover,
because winners are chosen by a complex and costly process of claims
evaluation and litigation, the lottery is highly unfair, benefiting the attorneys
and insurers who administer the game to a much greater degree than the
involuntary players. By one estimate, the medical malpractice tort system
returns to injured patients only twenty-eight cents of each dollar paid in as
insurance premiums, and of that amount, only 12.5 cents reimburse the victim
for economic losses not already compensated by other sources. 7 Although
some assert that the high cost of the system is justified by its contribution to
the maintenance of high quality standards, there should certainly be no
debate that there is considerable room for the public to gain from reform.8
Although tinkering with the tort system has occurred in the past and is
likely to continue, fundamental reform may be more advisable. There are two
possible routes to major reform. In addition to the obvious possibility of
legislative change, providers and patients might voluntarily agree to assume
quite different relationships than those that the law currently prescribes.
Having indicated briefly why reform is desirable, this article presents and
expands upon some ideas for reform that the writer has presented in other
forums. 9 The premises of this discussion are that better compensation for
injured persons is the primary desideratum,1 0 that "no-lawsuit""
compensation is both feasible and in the consumer's interest, and that
experimentation with new ideas would lead to better results than the tort
system is yielding. The objective here is to show how proposals for both
legislative and contractual reform using no-fault concepts, each meritorious
in its own right, can be blended into a liability system that dramatically
improves the present system.

5. The suggestions for legislative and contractual reform in this article could be applied to all
claims for personal injury, including those from malfunctioning products. O'Connell, Offers That
Can't Be Refused Foreclosure of Personal Injury Claims by Defendants' Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net
Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 589 (1982).
6. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
7. O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurancefor Many Kinds
of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 501, 509 (1976).
8. Even Professor Danzon, for all her support of the present system, see supra note 3 and
accompanying text, advocates very significant reforms, some of which are similar to those advanced
in the legislative and contractual proposals made herein. P. DANZON & L. LILLARD, supra note 3, at
30-32.
9. Moore & O'Connell, ForeclosingMedical Malpractice Claims by Prompt Tender of Economic Loss, 44
LA. L. REV. 1267, 1278-87 (1984); O'Connell, supra notes 2 and 5.
10. O'Connell, supra note 5, at 620.
11. The statutory device proposed herein is not, strictly speaking, one for no-fault insurance.
See infra note 37 and accompanying text. It is designed to avoid lawsuits, hence the appropriateness
of the term "no-lawsuit."
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II

Two "NEo-No-FAULT"

PROPOSALS

Through the years, reform efforts have succeeded on several occasions in
modifying tort law to provide more efficient and fairer payment for injury
without regard to fault. The first great effort in this regard was workers'
compensation, originally enacted in Germany in the late nineteenth century
and in North America in the early twentieth century. Prior to workers'
compensation, workers injured in the course of employment had to prove
their employers' fault and their own lack of contributory fault. Enlightened
employers in this country perceived the futile nature of the tort system as
applied to employment injuries, entailing as it did both huge transaction costs
and much uncompensated loss. Enacted with employers' support, workers'
compensation sought to eliminate disputes over fault in industrial accidents
and provide prompt payment of injured workers' economic losses.12
In recent years, no-fault auto insurance laws have sought to accomplish
similar goals.' 3 In this instance, each motorist or other party injured in an
auto accident is paid regardless of fault, but only for economic losses; with
statutory exceptions, these benefits displace tort claims arising out of the
accident. A recent U.S. Department of Transportation survey has indicated
how strikingly effective no-fault insurance can be in providing quicker, surer
14
payment at substantially lower cost than tort liability coverage.
The success of these tort reform initiatives naturally prompts interest in
using no-fault concepts to deal with iatrogenic injuries and the difficult
problems of the law of medical malpractice. However, grave difficulties would
obviously confront any system of no-fault insurance that undertook to
compensate all those injured by medical treatment. The main problem would
be how to define and recognize the insured event. Under no-fault auto
insurance, it is seldom difficult to recognize an injury "arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle." But can patients be
similarly compensated for all conditions "arising in the course of medical
treatment"? Would it not be difficult in many instances to know whether the
patient's injury resulted from treatment or from the condition which sent him
to the health care provider in the first place? Realistically, could a health care
provider or his insurer be required to pay every patient whose condition
worsens after treatment or who suffers some regrettable side effect?
Prompted by these difficulties and the seeming impasse in which the tort
system is locked, this writer has recently made two proposals, one for
legislation and one for private action, to ameliorate problems with the tort
12.

NAT'L COMM'N

ON STATE WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION LAWS,

COMPENDIUM ON WORKMEN'S

16-18 (M. Rosenblum ed. 1973). As to the greater efficacy of workers' compensation
laws, with all their shortcomings, as compared to tort law, see NAT'L COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAWS, REPORT 25, 45 (1972).
13. U.S. DEP'T TRANSP., COMPENSATING AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS: A FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON NoFAULT AUTO INSURANCE EXPERIENCES 1-24 (1985).
14. Id. at 3-6, 21-40.
COMPENSATION

Page 125: Spring 1986]

NEO-NO-FAULT

REMEDIES

liability system as applicable to medical accidents. Because these plans do not
contemplate total displacement of the fault system but hope to broaden the
availability of automatic indemnification for net economic loss, they have been
labeled "neo-no-fault" plans for present purposes. The following brief
descriptions of these two proposals and their respective rationales are offered
as a prelude to the subsequent discussion of how they complement one
another and of their potential for amalgamation into a single neo-no-fault
compensation scheme.
A.

A Scheme for Statutory Neo-No-Fault Compensation

A version of the neo-no-fault legislation proposed by this writer' 5 has been
introduced in Congress by Representatives Henson Moore and Richard
Gephardt' 6 and is described in some detail in the article in this symposium by
Congressman Moore and Washington attorney John Hoff. 17 The basic
concept is that a health care provider facing a potential or actual tort claim for
personal injury would have the option to foreclose such claim by offering,
within 180 days following injury, 18 to pay the injured party's net economic
loss, consisting in most cases of medical expenses and wage loss not covered
by his own insurance,' 9 and reasonable legal fees. 20 By statute, such a tender
of net economic loss would totally satisfy any personal injury claim, except in
cases of death or intentional injury. 2 ' Payments would be made periodically
as loss accrues, rather than in a lump sum. If the amount of compensable loss
was disputed, arbitration would fix the amount due.
Under present law, either party is obviously free to offer to settle for the
claimant's net economic loss. The difference is that, at present, neither party
need accept such an offer, whereas the proposed statute would give the
potential claimant no option to refuse. The obvious question is why the law
should force such a settlement on a claimant. Is it fair? The answer to this
question begins with a reminder that injured patients whose net economic
losses are paid are being treated very well in comparison with most victims of
misfortune in our society, whether from illness, injury, handicap, crime,
15.
16.

O'Connell, supra note 5.
H.R. 3084, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); see Moore & O'Connell, supra note 9, at 1267, 1278-

87.
17. See Moore & Hoff, H. R. 3084: A More Rational Compensation System for Medical Malpractice, LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 117.
18. The original article proposed a limit of 60 days. O'Connell, supra note 5, at 601. Whether
the limit is 60, 90, or 180 days is largely a matter of the drafter's discretion. Sufficient time is needed,
though, for a defendant to investigate the circumstances of the accident giving rise to the claim. Id.
at 625.
19. As a result of the political judgment of its congressional sponsors, H.R. 3084 calls for a
tender of full wage loss, similar to reimbursement at common law. As an alternative, the level of
wage loss could be defined objectively in an amount equivalent to the maximum weekly amount
guaranteed for wage loss under the workers' compensation law of the victim's domiciliary state.
Wage loss might also be indexed to inflation, but many insurers might resist it.
20. See infra text following note 35.
21. For alternative means of delineating which tort claims are preserved, see Moore &
O'Connell, supra note 9, at 1281-83.
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unemployment, or other mishap. Guaranteed prompt payment of all-or
even the great bulk-of economic losses is a rarity for the seriously impaired.
The theory behind the legislation, then, is that prompt payment to an injured
patient of his economic loss is a fair disposition of his case, especially taking
into account the prodigious expense, delay, and uncertainty of allowing
pursuit of larger awards through tort litigation.
Another objection to the proposal's fairness might be that it benefits
negligent health care providers by allowing them to foreclose actions for
noneconomic damages. It can indeed be anticipated that providers will
benefit by proffering tenders when their conduct has been clearly negligent
and when a tort action therefore would be likely to result in a judgment much
larger than the statutory benefit. It may also be feared that providers will
elect not to make tenders in marginal cases involving only a small risk of
liability and that the result of the legislation would therefore be simply a
windfall to providers and little increase in the number of patients receiving
compensation.
Despite these concerns, it is far from clear that providers or their insurers
will be so disinclined to tender the statutory benefits. A decision to tender net
economic loss will be made whenever the lump sum that the insurer must set
aside to pay them is less than the sum of (1) the anticipated costs of a legal
defense and (2) the likely recovery (appropriately discounted for the
possibility that a claim will not succeed). The latter figure under the law of
most jurisdictions must include, in addition to net economic loss, the amounts
being paid to the victim from collateral sources and the amount likely to be
awarded as noneconomic damages. For example, if injuries compensated by
collateral sources and damages for pain and suffering would likely total
$250,000 and the defendant stands only a sixty percent chance of winning, the
discounted value of such additional damages exceeding net economic loss
would be $100,000. Given the huge cost of litigating malpractice cases, the
frequently substantial amounts covered by health and disability insurance, the
potential for large awards for pain and suffering, and the uncertainty factor,
the economic inducement to tender net economic loss will be substantial in
many cases. In addition, defendants may favor tenders for noneconomic
reasons, hoping to avoid the anguish, bitterness, and publicity of adversary
litigation. A clue to the likely impact of the proposed statute on the incidence
of litigation comes from a prominent defense attorney who, upon hearing the
terms of H.R. 3084, told the author that he would be prompted to
recommend settlement for net economic loss in forty-eight of fifty current
22
cases in his office.
The statute would also encourage providers to tender benefits by allowing
them to extend immunity from suit to other parties who face a risk of being
held jointly and severally liable for the injury in a tort action-a risk that is
enhanced when the first provider obtains immunity by tendering net
22.

Personal communication to author, Charlottesville, Virginia (April 1984).
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economic loss. 2 3 Such a provision would give any provider contemplating a
tender power to seek a contribution to the settlement fund from other parties
involved in treating the patient-including such remote parties as a medical
equipment manufacturer. If the tendering and third parties could not reach
an immediate agreement concerning a third party's contribution, the third
party's contribution would be established later through arbitration.
B.

Implementing the Neo-No-Fault Concept by Contract

Because legislation of the kind proposed may not be enacted soon, 2 4 the
possibilities for achieving similar results by private initiative have also been
considered. In the resulting proposal, 2 5 it was suggested that a health care
provider should purchase an insurance policy that would fund a tender of net
economic loss to any patient injured in specified ways. 2 6 The provider would
also obligate himself or itself, prior to rendering services, to tender such
payment to any patients suffering a covered injury within ninety days. Unlike
the usual settlement offer, this tender would be made automatically and
without regard to criteria of tort liability. Once the tender is made and by the
express terms of the original undertaking, the victim and anyone with a claim
based on the victim's injury (a family member, for example) would have an
additional ninety days either to accept the offer or to claim in tort. 27 If the
claimant accepts the no-fault tender of net economic loss, he gives up the
23. The bill states that any physician or hospital or other health care provider that believes it is
at risk of liability may make the tender to the injured patient. Such a provider may also designate any
third person who may be liable as a participant in the tender. The issue of what amount, if any, the
third person must contribute to the amount to be tendered would be determined in a separate
proceeding. The third person so designated receives the same protection against tort claims as a
tendering provider. Although a third person can thus be compelled to participate in the tendering
process against his will, he will not be disadvantaged in that he thereby avoids exposure to liability
for noneconomic tort damages (including pain and suffering), and can still dispute his liability under
the tender.
Indeed, even without compulsion, third parties potentially liable in tort will feel enormous
pressure to join in a tender. If third parties did not join, they would face a much more aggressive
claimant, who, like a workers' compensation recipient pursuing a third-party tort claim, would have
been assured of his or her basic losses and would thus be much more able to resist settlement offers
than would a normal, impecunious injury victim. J. O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTrERY 216 (1979).
24. For a description of the frustrations entailed in trying to pass legislation, see O'Connell,
supra note 2, at 905-06.
25. Because the costs of such contracts will be difficult to predict, the neo-no-fault plan could be
introduced in a pilot program which would limit coverage to a given area or period of time, or both.
The findings from such a pilot program could be fully studied and evaluated before the neo-no-fault
plan was implemented on a larger scale.
26. Here, too, as under the legislative proposal, net economic loss will encompass all medical
expenses (including rehabilitation) and wage loss (up to, for example, three hundred dollars per
week) which the injured party's own collateral sources, such as accident and health insurance or sick
leave, do not cover. For a more detailed description of some aspects of the proposal, see O'Connell,
supra note 2, at 906-10.
27. The policy could be drafted so that the party against whom a personal injury claim is made
could, at its option, make the tender even before the claim is made. Thus, a potential payor could
avoid waiting until just before the statute of limitations has run to tender the victim's net economic
loss. Instead, it could do so at any time after injury, thereby starting the 90-day period within which
the claimant would have to decide whether to accept the tender. As to whether the period should be
90 days or some other period, see supra note 18.
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right to sue for tort damages. This new proposal would not require a
potential victim to waive his right to sue in tort prior to an accident. Instead,
he must only choose, after an accident, whether to accept no-fault benefits or
to pursue his tort action. Thus, any legal difficulties presented by a waiver of
a legal right prior to the occurrence of an injury would be avoided. 28 For
legal purposes, the tender and its acceptance would operate simply as a
settlement of the tort claim.
Obviously, in this instance, unlike the situation under the proposal to
legislate neo-no-fault compensation, the health care provider and the insurer
cannot force an unwilling injured person to accept payment of his net
economic loss. Indeed, one might ask how offers under this plan differ from
identical postaccident offers of settlement that can be made under present
law. The key difference, and the one that makes this plan attractive, is the
preaccident guarantee by the provider that it will make such an offer in the
event an injury occurs. This guarantee removes adversary game-playing
considerations from the potential defendant's decision to offer a settlement.
Because the settlement offer is no longer discretionary, a defendant or an
insurer need not fear that the offer to cover net economic loss will be
perceived simply as an opening bid or as a signal of weakness, 2 9 encouraging
plaintiffs-and especially their lawyers-to hold out for more. Being made
pursuant to a preaccident guarantee, the offer is not only certain to be made
but is more likely to be accepted.
The objection usually made to the proposal that health care providers
voluntarily commit themselves to make postaccident tenders of net economic
loss upon the occurrence of a defined event is that such commitments will
result in many more payouts without preventing patients from pursuing huge
awards in cases where liability is relatively clear. Because injured patients
retain the option to accept or reject payment of net economic loss, it can
reasonably be feared that those with promising tort claims would opt to sue
while only those with a poor prospect for a larger recovery would accept the
tender. This scenario is unduly pessimistic, however. Those who have
suffered serious injury could be expected to be quite risk-averse when it
comes to choosing between, on the one hand, a certain, immediate benefit
that, together with collateral sources, makes him economically-if not
physically-whole and, on the other hand, an uncertain chance of eventually
winning a much larger amount. Evidence to support the expectation that

victims will accept offers of net economic losses comes from a program for
28.

For a similar proposal, developed independently, see 1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY

OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, COMPENSATING FOR
RESEARCH INJURIES: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF PROGRAMS TO REDRESS

INJURIES CAUSED BY BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 148 (1982).

29. Concerning this point (that such a tender of net economic loss entails no signal of the
defendant's tort liability), the preaccident definition of the insured event calling for tender would
have to be sufficiently broad so as not to include only cases where there would be clear tort liability;
otherwise, the tender would smack of a signal of the weakness of defendant's case.
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high school athletes adopted in 1982.30 Of twenty-one seriously injured
athletes eligible for compensation under that program, twenty opted to accept
the tendered benefits and to forego their right to sue in tort. The one athlete
who declined compensation was a gymnast who recovered fully and had little
economic loss but had a chance of recovering for pain and suffering.
Although the proposed contractual scheme for funding automatic tenders
of net economic loss would save substantial litigation costs and reduce many
damage awards, it could end up costing more than malpractice insurance if it
undertakes to pay many claims that would not have been paid under a tort
regime. Cost is not the only consideration, however, that would influence a
provider's decision to adopt it. The prospect of avoiding the stigma and
unpleasantness of malpractice suits and the opportunity to ensure reasonable
compensation for patients injured whether or not as a result of provider fault
might induce a provider to incur higher costs. Indeed, the wider and more
dependable financial protection offered to patients under the proposed
scheme might give the provider a competitive advantage that would more
than offset any higher prices that might have to be charged.
There are several opportunities for lowering the cost to the provider of the
contractual neo-no-fault scheme without diminishing its other attractions.
One approach would be to provide in the contract that the victim, by
accepting the tendered benefits, also loses his tort rights against any third
parties whom the tendering party designates. This provision would permit
bargaining with such third parties for a contribution toward the payment of
net economic loss benefits. One possibility would be that third parties-for
example, physicians practicing in a hospital undertaking to tender no-fault
benefits-would share the premium burden, paying into the fund at the
commencement of the policy period and becoming additional insureds under
the policy. Alternatively, the provider initiating the scheme could reserve the
right to designate the jointly and severally liable third parties who would be
protected by the settlement at the time benefits were tendered, thus giving it
30. Telephone interview with Doug Rudlinger, insurance broker for the National Federation of
State High School Associations (March 1986).
The author drafted the insurance contract discussed here to cover serious high school athletic
injuries commencing with the 1983-84 academic year. The plan, drafted under the auspices of the
National Federation of State High School Associations, is now in effect in 49 states, covering 60% of
all U.S. high schools. This plan entails a neo-no-fault policy for unlimited medical expenses plus
$300 per week for wage loss payable to catastrophically injured athletes. The premium for such
coverage is approximately $1.25 per year for each athlete covered, and is paid by the school. (This
cost may well be equalled-and perhaps exceeded-by savings in liability insurance costs from the
tort waivers.) The plan has a $25,000 deductible, meaning that the policy is triggered when medical
and rehabilitation expenses and lost wages exceed that amount. No payment is made for pain and
suffering.
As indicated above, the coverage goes into effect only if the beneficiary and his family agree not to
file a tort suit against the school, school district, or state athletic association. As with the neo-no-fault
plan suggested in the text, however, there is no preaccident waiver of legal rights here. After an
accident, the injured party must decide whether to sign the contract and accept the benefits or to
reject the contract and sue in tort. As stated in the text, so far all athletes who have been offered the
plan have signed the contract and accepted the benefits.
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leverage to bargain for a contribution to the pool established to pay the
specific victim.
Another way of reducing the cost of a preaccident commitment to tender
compensation would be to limit the duty to pay for nonserious injuries.
Victims of medical malpractice are less likely to pursue tort claims for minor
injuries than are, say, victims of slips and falls or auto accidents.3 1 Knowing
this, the health care provider has much less incentive to offer a no-fault

compensation plan for such injuries. Accordingly, the provider might exclude
smaller claims from the terms of the contract, stipulating that actual medical
expenses or wage loss must exceed, for example, $25,000 before a tender
must be made. Further, the list of compensable events contained in the
contract might be designed to include only medically serious injuries. For
example, coverage might be limited to such adverse results of surgery as brain
damage or loss of a limb or vital organ, with the stipulation that adverse
results directly related to the normal progression of the original illness or
disease are excluded from coverage. 3 2 Similarly, the same range of injuries
could be covered when they resulted from a failure of diagnosis, although in
this case there would be no limitation to effects whose origins were
33
independent of the original illness or disease.
Because injured parties to whom compensation for net economic loss is
tendered do not lose their tort rights, they will often wish to retain a lawyer
and to engage in discovery before deciding whether to accept the tender. The
contract itself should probably affirm the health care provider's obligation to
cooperate in such discovery. Although the ninety-day time limit for
acceptance of a tender opens the door for footdragging in the disclosure of
evidence of negligence, any plaintiff believing that a provider is stonewalling
has two options. He could accept the settlement but later challenge it on the
ground the provider behaved improperly; although a heavy presumption of
validity attaches to settlements,3 4 proof of material nondisclosure of evidence
of negligence would probably result in the settlement's being overturned.
Alternatively, the injured patient could try for equitable relief to speed up the
35
discovery process or to get an extension of the deadline for acceptance.
31. This reluctance to pursue small claims is due to the fact that product and malpractice suits
involve technical engineering and medical evidence, entailing the need for expensive expert
witnesses. Consequently, only the most serious injuries justify such an investment. J. O'CONNELL,
supra note 23, at 178; see FIRST WORLD CONGRESS ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, PROCEEDINGS 177 (1977)

(remarks of M. Belli); J. O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 12-18, 41; O'Connell, An Elective No-Fault Liability
Statute, 1975 INS. L.J. 261, 290-91.
Even when the provider's liability is relatively clear, a victim who suffers no residual injury has
little incentive to sue for loss of a few thousand dollars. To pursue the case would often not be
profitable for a competent plaintiff's attorney.
32. Certain instances of express assumption of risk might also be excepted, as with, for example,
optional back operations where the risk of poor results are great.
33. This inclusion is because the failure of diagnosis leads to the normal progression of the
(undiagnosed) disease or illness.
34. E.g., Thorn Wire Hedge Co. v. Washburn & Moen Mfg. Co., 159 U.S. 423, 444 (1895).
35. The contract might well provide that if a recipient of benefits challenges the validity of the
contract, the recipient must immediately return all amounts previously paid, the obligations to pay
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Attorney Fees and Services

Under both neo-no-fault proposals, the amount tendered to a patient to
cover his net economic loss should include a reasonable fee for an attorney's
services in connection with the determination and collection of the net
economic loss. This compensation is necessary because no payment is made
for pain and suffering. Under the present tort system the allowance for pain
and suffering is often used, as a practical matter, to pay the plaintiff's
attorney, thus preserving funds meant to replace wage loss or pay medical
expenses.
Under the contractual proposal, the provision for attorney fees arguably
should not cover, in addition to services related to payment of net economic
loss, a lawyer's time and effort spent on investigating the wisdom of a tort
action. Such time and effort should probably be deemed an investment by the
lawyer that is recoupable only through contingent fees earned in normal tort
actions. In any event, a claimant's lawyer who stands to receive a larger
contingent fee in the event of tort litigation would have a conflict of interests
36
in advising his client against accepting the tender of net economic lOSS.
Thus, when a claimant rejects such a tender in favor of a tort action, the
tendering party could offer to pay for a second opinion as to the wisdom of
litigation from a lawyer who will certify that he will not, directly or indirectly,
represent the claimant in a related tort action. Provision for such second
opinions could be made in the contract.
III
THE

Two

PROPOSALS COMPARED

What are the similarities and differences between the foregoing legislative
and contractual proposals, both of which contemplate that injurers should
tender to injured parties their net economic loss? What are the comparable
advantages and disadvantages of each approach? Are they mutually exclusive,
or can they be coordinated?
The premise of both proposals is that, although guaranteeing no-fault
benefits to all victims of medical accidents may pose seemingly
insurmountable problems, those problems should not prevent the provision
of such benefits to many victims. The two proposals necessarily proceed
down different paths to this objective, circumventing the existing tort system
by different routes.
The key difference between the two plans for neo-no-fault compensation
lies in the discretion exercised by the respective parties. Under the
contractual plan, the injurer is under a self-imposed contractual obligation to
further losses on a no-fault basis cease, and, if the defendant prevails in a subsequent trial, the
recipient must pay the defendant's litigation costs.
36. Note that a plaintiff's lawyer who advises a seriously injured client to reject the prompt-but
temporary-offer conferring essential losses might well be confronted with a legal malpractice action
himself if the gamble of the medical malpractice action fails.
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tender no-fault benefits, while the injured party has a choice between
accepting the tender and pursuing a tort action. In the case of the legislative
plan, the injurer has a choice between tendering no-fault benefits and risking
a tort suit, while the injured party is under a statutory obligation to accept the
tender of benefits if it is made. In contrast to these two approaches, a
complete no-fault system for all victims, such as statutory workers'
compensation, operates by giving neither side an option: the injurer must
tender, and the injured party must accept, the latter's economic loss. Under
the common law, on the other hand, the injurer has the option of making or
not making a postaccident tender of the injured party's economic loss (or any
other amount), and the injured party has the option of accepting or not
accepting any offer that is made.
If the common law approach is unsatisfactory and imposition of the pure
no-fault alternative upon both parties is similarly unsatisfactory or impossible,
two options remain: (1) requiring the injurer to tender specified benefits
while leaving the injured party free to refuse the tender, or (2) requiring the
injured party to accept a tender of specified benefits while leaving the injurer
free not to make such a tender.3 7 Although either of these arrangements
could theoretically be adopted by either contract or statute, there would be
greater acceptance of private contracts achieving the former result-that is,
one in which the injurer, rather than the weaker, more sympathetic injured
party, has his options curtailed. This helps explain why a statute is thought
necessary to cut off injured patients' malpractice rights upon receipt of a
health care provider's discretionary tender of net economic loss. Rightly or
wrongly, courts might be unreceptive to a provider/patient agreement that
attempted to confer on the provider a similar power to force settlement of
38
potential tort claims on advantageous terms.
37. Another variation on this contractual device is legislative authorization of mutually binding
preaccident contractual commitments to no-fault benefits in lieu of tort. O'Connell, Elective No-Fault
Liability by Contract With or Without an Enabling Statute, 1975 U. ILL. L. REv. 59; O'Connell, No-Fault
Liability by Contractfor Doctors, Manufacturers, Retailers and Others, 1975 INS. L.J. 531. This approach was
widely followed in the case of elective workers' compensation. 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW § 67 (1983). A further legislative variation would allow the injurer the option of
a preaccident commitment to pay no-fault in lieu of tort, which would bind the injured party to nofault benefits. J. O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 97-175, 204-45. In fact, almost anything would be better
than the present system. See infra text accompanying note 43.
38. Lacking a statute, the injured party cannot be denied his right to refuse an offer of
settlement. This explains the injured party's option under the contractual plan. But even by statute
there is no workable way a defendant can be obligated to accept a claimant's tender of settlement.
Such a scheme would allow a claimant to make almost random claims and extract payments for them.
Thus, in order to encourage settlement for economic loss to a greater extent than under the common
law, the proposed statute puts the injured party under an obligation to accept the injurer's tender of
such benefits-which explains the injurer's option under the statutory plan.
It is important to keep in mind the crucial factor that, under both the legislative and contractual
proposals, the tender of net economic loss is not a signal of weakness in the health care provider's
case such that the plaintiff is thereby prompted to ask for more than net economic loss. Under the
statutory plan, the plaintiff cannot turn down the tender; under the contractual plan, because the
tender is made pursuant to a preaccident commitment (before the circumstances of the accident
could have been known), plaintiffs cannot assume that the tender is a floor from which higher offers
will spring. See supra pp. 118-19.
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The contractual approach to providing neo-no-fault compensation has the
advantage over the legislative approach that it avoids the uncertainty,
frustration, and pitfalls of adopting legislation. Unlike the statutory proposal,
the contractual approach, once it is voluntarily implemented, commits the
potential injurer to tender net economic loss for given injuries. Because the
commitment is made on a preaccident basis, however, it presents the
formidable problems, already noted with respect to proposals for
comprehensive no-fault coverage of medical injuries, of defining the range of
injuries for which no-fault benefits will be offered. 3 9 The difficulty of
specifying compensable events may limit the plan's utility.
Another shortcoming of the contractual approach is that it is feasible only
40
for serious injuries and can do little about smaller, nuisance-type tort claims
or claims involving small amounts of net economic loss. When the tendered
payment is not large, an injured patient may find that it is not to his advantage
to forego his right to claim in tort for pain and suffering and for economic loss
covered by collateral sources. Thus, while the contractual device can ensure
prompt payment of net economic loss when the injured party badly needs
such help, it can do little to foreclose expensive, cumbersome, and
unnecessary tort litigation when little economic loss has been suffered and the
windfall potential seems bright.
This major failing of the contractual approach highlights a key advantage
of the statutory tender plan. Discretionary tenders of net economic loss
would be most likely when relatively little net loss had been suffered and a
substantial tort recovery seemed probable. The difficulty with the statutory
plan, however, is that, as previously suggested, the injurer may be unlikely to
tender net economic loss when that loss is substantial and the tort claim looks
defensible. Thus, the shortcomings of the statutory plan mirror the
contractual plan's strengths, and vice versa. Neither plan can ensure both
prompt payment of net economic loss to needy victims and the elimination of
tort actions seeking primarily noneconomic damages, duplicative recoveries
of wage loss and medical expenses, and extensive litigation expenses. Each
system still leaves too much to the vagaries of tort litigation.
Despite their respective shortcomings, each proposal would eliminate
some tort claims-which proposal would eliminate more claims is hard to
say-and facilitate prompt coverage of many needy patients' net economic
losses. The overriding point is simply that each plan offers substantial
incentives to use dollars formerly misspent on investigating and litigating or
settling tort actions to pay patients' real losses. Thus, both approaches
should be simultaneously pursued: contracts should be implemented and
legislation encouraged.
39. See supra text following note 14.
40. O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants' Paymentfor Pain and Suffering in Return for Payment of
Claimants'Attorneys' Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 333, 334-40. As noted earlier, however, smaller claims
are not a major problem in the products liability and malpractice areas. See supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
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IV
THE Two PROPOSALS COMBINED:

LEGISLATION WITH PROVISION

FOR CONTRACTUAL TENDERS OF NET ECONOMIC LOSS

The suggestion that neo-no-fault compensation for medical injuries
should be pursued simultaneously through both legislation and private
contract may seem peculiar because passage of a well-drafted statute allowing
health care providers to make binding tenders of net economic loss would
remove the incentive for providers to make preaccident contractual
commitments to make such postaccident offers. Why would a physician,
hospital, or organized health plan make such a preaccident commitment to
make offers that a claimant can turn down when the statute would allow
discretionary postaccident tenders that a claimant cannot reject? The
question suggests a need to modify the statutory proposal so that its
enactment would not deter implementation of the contractual approach.
Because the statutory scheme fails to ensure compensation in many cases
by leaving injurers with discretion not to tender, substantial benefits would
flow from marrying the two schemes so that preaccident commitments would
be encouraged. This blending could be accomplished by providing that any
party who tenders net economic loss pursuant to a preaccident contractual
commitment is entitled to indemnity from anyone tendering pursuant to a
statute. Thus, a surgeon who had agreed in advance of surgery to pay for
neurologic injury suffered as a consequence of surgery would be entitled to
indemnification by a hospital that tendered after surgery out of fear of a tort
41
suit against it for negligence in the administration of anesthesia.
The dynamics of this proposal can be seen by pursuing several alternative
scenarios:
(1) If the patient rejects the surgeon's obligatory contractual tender, the surgeon
then has the option to make a (binding) statutory tender and will do so if he shares the
injured party's opinion that a tort action is likely to benefit the latter.
(2) If the patient received either the surgeon's contractual or statutory tender, the
patient's tort rights against the hospital (assuming it has no contractual obligation to
tender) could be cut off by the latter's statutory tender, in which event the hospital
must indemnify the surgeon's contractual obligation to cover net economic loss. In

41. To be more precise, the statute could thus provide, regarding the tenders of unlimited
medical benefits plus a defined level of wage loss, that indemnification would be due any party
tendering contractually from any party tendering statutorily. The level of wage loss could be defined
objectively, in dollar amounts of, perhaps, $300 per month or, in the alternative, in an amount
equivalent to the maximum weekly amount guaranteed for wage loss under the workers'
compensation law of the victim's domiciliary state. As a further alternative, the statute could leave
the requisite terms of the contract entitling the contractual tenderer to indemnification for definition
by a pertinent public official such as a state insurance commissioner or the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, depending upon whether it is a state or federal law. Note that if the statute calls for
greater wage loss to be tendered, allowing a lesser contractual tender would be an additional
inducement to institute a contractual scheme because a contractual offeror will be liable for less wage
loss. For example, if a party tendering pursuant to contract obligates itself to pay $300 per week for
wage loss, but the statute requires a tender of $500 per week for wage loss, the party tendering
pursuant to contract need never obligate itself to pay more than $300 wage loss pursuant to a tender,
and even payment of that lesser amount will be shifted to anyone tendering pursuant to statute.
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this way, the patient recovers his net economic loss and is unlikely to be left with a
promising opportunity to sue either party in tort.
(3) The same would be true if the patient accepts the contractual offer and no
offer is made by the hospital (either under the statute or in response to the surgeon's
request to contribute to contractual benefits, because the hospital views its tort
exposures as slight).
(4) If the patient declines the contractual offer and no statutory offer is made by
the surgeon (who views his tort exposure as slight), the hospital may still make a
statutory tender that may or may not include the surgeon.

As these scenarios show, combining contractual and statutory tenders can
ensure both that fewer tort actions for noneconomic damages and pain and
suffering are brought and that fewer economic losses suffered by injured
patients go uncompensated. Although providers still retain discretion with
respect to making preaccident commitments to cover particular injuries, the
provision requiring statutory tenderers to indemnify the cost of contractual
commitments will enhance the likelihood that such commitments will be
made. Thus, amendment of H.R. 3084 to encourage the use of contracts
implementing neo-no-fault compensation would seem desirable. Enactment
of the modified federal proposal and of similar state statutes would go far
toward ending the malpractice lottery on terms ensuring that patients' vital
interests are well served.
V
DETERRENCE

An anticipated criticism of the proposals herein is that, in providing
payment only for net economic loss, they undermine the value of tort
damages in deterring injury-causing conduct. It is far from clear, however,
whether adoption of either proposal would result in undesirable changes in
the behavior of health care providers. In the first place, the assumption that
negligence is effectively prevented by fear of legal liability and assessment of
tort damages has been subject to cogent challenge. 4 2 One set of questions
concerns the effect of liability insurance, which diffuses financial
responsibility. Moreover, in the medical context, pressure to achieve good
treatment results comes from other sources, including professional pride, the
fear of adverse publicity, concern for the opinion of associates and referring
physicians, and the need to maintain hospital privileges and other
relationships. It is also arguable that malpractice law's influence on provider
behavior is not altogether beneficial, resulting in wasteful "defensive
42. For an effective indictment of the tort system, see Tullock, Negligence Again, 1 INT'L REV. L. &
EcoN. 52 (1981); Tullock, Welfare and Law, 2 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 151 (1982). Tullock points out
how very costly and wasteful the tort system often is in (1) its use of wasteful and manipulative
adversary attempts at proving or disproving fault, (2) its likelihood of errors in determining fault, and
(3) its failure to distribute losses. Tullock also emphasizes how legal-economic analysis often fails to
consider the beneficial-and indeed economically efficient-results from no-fault or similar nontort
schemes for payments.
For additional scholarly doubts about the deterrent effects of tort rules, see Epstein, The Social
Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1717 (1982); Pierce, EncouragingSafety: The Limits
of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281 (1980).
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medicine" that fails to benefit patients either at all or enough to justify the
high cost. Nor is it without significance that neither workers' compensation
nor automobile no-fault laws are generally perceived as having weakened
43
deterrence of careless conduct.
It is similarly the case that the neo-no-fault plans offered here do not
eliminate deterrent effects. The contractual scheme, by committing the
provider to pay without regard to fault, creates incentives to avoid bad
outcomes even when negligence is not their cause. Although both the
legislative and the contractual proposals relieve providers from paying losses
already covered by collateral sources, those proposals are hardly unique in
this respect; statutes in several states currently allow deduction of collateral
sources from malpractice verdicts as a way of preventing the waste of precious

insurance dollars on duplication of amounts already compensated by other
forms of insurance. 44 Moreover, if great emphasis is given to the value of
deterrence, it would be easy enough to modify either scheme to call for the
tender to include reimbursement of collateral sources for their outlays. Thus,
legislators or insurers interested in using the neo-no-fault device to avoid
litigating over fault and the value of pain and suffering need not be dissuaded
by the argument that deterrence must necessarily be sacrificed.
VI
CONCLUSION

The tragic irony of the tort liability system is that it protects everyone
connected with it except those who need protection most-the seriously
injured whose losses outstrip their own collateral sources. Obviously, tort
liability insurers are protected by distributing their risks with actuarial
precision among their policyholders-and reinsuring to the extent they fear
catastrophic losses beyond their own resources. Obviously, too, insureds are
protected against personal financial loss; indeed, as a practical matter, tort
claims are not brought except against insured defendants or corporate
institutions that have opted for self-insurance. 4 5 Defendants' lawyers are
protected in that they are guaranteed payment for their services out of the
insurance fund, win or lose. Even plaintiffs' lawyers are protected, despite
43.

See U.S. DEP'T TRANSP., supra note 13, at 141-43, 159-66 (auto accidents); 2 F. HARPER & F.

JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 13.5, at 775-76 (1956) (workers' compensation).

44. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 333.1(a) (West 1985); P. DANZON, THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 40-41 (The Rand Corp., Report No. R-2870-ICJ/HCFA, 1982).
Given the huge amount of unreimbursed losses from injuries resulting from health care delivery,
health care providers will continue to pay for large amounts of loss when they are paying for net
economic loss, and losses will thus still be internalized to a significant degree compared to that being
achieved at common law. Robinson, The Medical MalpracticeCrisis of the 1970's: A Retrospective, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 14 n.50 (citing, among other sources, CAL. MEDICAL ASS'N AND
CAL. Hosp. ASs'N, REPORT ON THE MEDICAL INSURANCE FEASIBILITY STUDY

103-05 (D. Mills ed.

1977)). The difference will be in the healthy result of using malpractice dollars to pay for individuals'
losses not otherwise covered by insurance sources, rather than retransferring insurance dollars to
insurance companies that are already covering losses. O'Connell, supra note 5, at 593.
45. James & Law, Compensationfor Auto Accident Victims: A Story of Too Little and Too Late, 26 CONN.
B.J. 70, 78-79 (1951).
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their supposedly contingent fees, because they can turn down cases where
recovery is unlikely and maintain a diversified portfolio of many cases that
makes tolerable the loss of any single case. Injury victims whose economic
losses are already compensated by collateral sources-in large measure, the
less seriously injured-are also, by hypothesis, adequately protected. So, of
all the parties to the series of transactions that lead to medical injuries and the
subsequent allocation of the economic consequences of those losses, only
those who need insurance the most-seriously injured patients whose losses
significantly exceed their collateral sources-are left unprotected. Cruelly,
they are left unable to learn when or what or whether they will be paid and are
forced to pursue a long, agonizing, and uncertain path as their only
alternative to financial as well as medical catastrophe.
By the devices described herein, tort liability insurance dollars could be
better used, providing much greater protection for many seriously injured
patients than does the lawyer-dominated common law tort system.

